From being to identity: analysis and synthesis of the self

19 - 20 May 2025 09:00 - 17:00 The Royal Society Free Watch online
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Discussion meeting organised by Professor Tony Prescott, Professor Agnieszka Wykowska, Professor Sarah Garfinkel, and Professor Paul Verschure.

What is the self and how is it constituted? How can we understand the diversity of human selves? Will technology change our sense of self? We will explore these critical questions through contemporary analytic approaches, in psychology, neuroscience and philosophy to understanding human selves, and synthetic approaches that investigate the construction of sense of self in artefacts such as robots.  

Please note the programme may be subject to change.

Poster session

There will be a poster session on Monday 19 May. If you would like to present a poster, please submit your proposed title, abstract (up to 200 words), author list, and the name of the proposed presenter and institution to the Scientific Programmes team. Acceptances may be made on a rolling basis so we recommend submitting as soon as possible in case the session becomes full. Submissions made within one month of the meeting may not be included in the programme booklet.

Attending the event

This event is intended for researchers in relevant fields.

  • Free to attend
  • Both virtual and in-person attendance is available. Advance registration is essential. Please follow the link to register.
  • Lunch is available on both days of the meeting for an optional £25 per day. There are plenty of places to eat nearby if you would prefer to purchase food offsite. Participants are welcome to bring their own lunch to the meeting.

Enquiries: Scientific Programmes team.

Organisers

  • Professor Tony Prescott, University of Sheffield, UK

    Professor Tony Prescott

    Tony Prescott is Professor of Cognitive Robotics at the University of Sheffield in the UK. His background mixes psychology, neuropathology and brain theory with robotics and AI, and his research aims at answering questions about natural intelligence by creating synthetic entities with capacities such as perception, memory, emotion and sense of self. He has worked extensively on brain-inspired cognitive architectures for both mammal-like and humanoid robots, and with his own collaborators has created several novel animal-like robot platforms. Tony has co-authored over 250 journal articles and conference papers and the edited volumes Scholarpedia of Touch and the Handbook of Living Machines. His popular science book The Psychology of Artificial Intelligence, published in 2024, explores the similarities and differences between human and artificial intelligence.

  • Professor Agnieszka Wykowska, Italian Institute of Technology, Italy

    Professor Agnieszka Wykowska

    Professor Agnieszka Wykowska is the head of the unit "Social Cognition in Human-Robot Interaction" at the Italian Institute of Technology (IIT), in Genoa, Italy. She is also the Coordinator of the Centre for Human Technologies (IIT). She has a Master's Degree in Neuro-Cognitive Psychology (2006) and a PhD in Psychology (2008) from the Ludwig Maximillian University Munich. In 2016 she was awarded the ERC Starting grant "InStance: Intentional Stance for Social Attunement". She is Editor-in-Chief of International Journal of Social Robotics. Between 2022 and 2024 she served in the role of President of the European Society for Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience (ESCAN). In 2023 she was awarded the Hans-Fischer Senior Fellowship from the TUM Institute of Advanced Studies to lead a research group "Human Cognition in Neuroengineering". She combines cognitive neuroscience methods with human-robot interaction to understand the human brain mechanisms in interaction with other humans and technology.

  • Professor Sarah Garfinkel

    Professor Sarah Garfinkel

    Sarah Garfinkel is a Professor of Cognitive Neuroscience and Group Leader of the Clinical and Affective Neuroscience Group at the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London (UCL). She completed her PhD in Experimental Psychology the University of Sussex, before undergoing a fellowship in Psychiatry and Neuroscience at the University of Michigan with further training in Autonomic Neuroscience at the Brighton and Sussex Medical School. Her current work at UCL focuses on brain-body interactions underlying emotion and cognition, with a particular focus on the heart. Adopting a translational perspective, she investigates the relationship between cardiac mechanisms and emotion in different clinical conditions. In September 2018, Sarah was named by the journal Nature as one of 11 "Rising Star" researchers, across all STEM disciplines internationally. In 2021 Sarah was awarded the mid-career prize by the British Cognitive Neuroscience Society. 

  • Professor Paul Verschure, Universidad Miguel Hernandez de Elche, Spain

    Professor Paul Verschure

    Dr Paul FMJ Verschure is the Unversidad Miguel de Elche Distinguished Professor affiliated with the CSIC Alicante Institute of Neuroscience and Department of Health Psychology. Paul has received his MA and PhD in Psychology and pursued his research at different leading international institutes, including the Neurosciences Institute and the Salk Institute, both in San Diego, the University of Amsterdam, University of Zurich, the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology-ETH, University Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona and Radboud Universiteit.

    Paul has developed a unified theory of mind and brain, Distributed Adaptive Control (DAC), where he validates using empirical and synthetic methods. His research spans neuroscience, neurotechnology, cognitive science, robotics, artificial intelligence, and virtual/augmented-mixed reality. DAC has been applied to various technology that support and advance the human condition in the areas of Digital Brain Health, Education, and Cultural Heritage. Paul has coordinated and participated in many European projects, including as coordinator of the European University Alliance of Brain and Technology NeurotechEU.

    Paul founded the SPECS research group in 1996, which comprised a multidisciplinary team of doctoral and post-doctoral researchers, including psychologists, engineers, and biologists who have widely published their results in leading journals and conferences. Paul co-chairs the annual Living Machines conference, the Alicante/Barcelona Cognition, Brain and Technology summer school, and he hosts the Convergent Science Network podcast with over 120 episodes. Paul has started several spin-off companies, Eodyne Systems and Sapiens5, and chairs the Future Memory Foundation and the Convergent Science Network. Paul is a dedicated endurance athlete and has completed 25 Ironman races.

Schedule

Chair

Professor Sarah Garfinkel

Professor Sarah Garfinkel

University College London, UK

09:00-09:05 Welcome by the Royal Society and lead organiser
09:05-09:30 A systems view of the human self

The experience of being, or having, a self -  contained by our bodies and able to act in the world - comes naturally to us as humans, along with a feeling of being the same self from day-to-day and of seeing others as also being selves. For William James, there were two sides to the self - the subject "I", and the object "me". While philosophy and consciousness science have largely focused on the problem of subjectivity; psychology, and latterly, cognitive neuroscience have developed a science of understanding self as object. An important theme, initiated by Ulrich Neisser, is the decomposition of the self into ecological (physical), interpersonal, temporally-extended, conceptual and private aspects. Results from the analytical sciences - particularly developmental psychology, cognitive neuroscience and neurology - support the notion that these aspects of self derive from partially dissociable sub-systems that combine to form the broader self. Recent synthetic approaches, including cognitive robotics, are making it possible to build and test theories of the construction of the self in behaving systems. The emerging "systems" view of self suggests a possible route to re-unifying "I" and "me" by seeing both as the consequence of an embodied complex dynamical system actively inferring its own existence as the best explanation for its experience. This talk will give an overview of this systems perspective by way of an introduction to the Discussion Meeting on sense of self.

Professor Tony Prescott

Professor Tony Prescott

University of Sheffield, UK

09:30-09:40 Discussion
09:40-10:10 Subjectivity and selfhood: is there a difference?

It should by now be fairly well established that it makes little sense to ask questions such as "what are the underlying mechanisms of selfhood", "when in development does selfhood emerge" or "can the intake of psychedelics lead to self-loss" if one does not specify what aspect, or dimension or sense of self one is targeting. Already in 1988, Neisser distinguished five senses of self (the ecological, interpersonal, extended, private, and conceptual) and went on to argue that they differ in their developmental histories and in the pathologies to which they are subject. Given this variety, one obvious question to ask is how minimal one can go. What is the least you can make do with and still call a self? The discussion of that particular question is ongoing. In my talk, I will engage with quite recent debates in philosophy of mind, Buddhist studies, and the study of psychedelics, and address the question of whether the subjectivity of experience amounts to a minimal and foundational form of selfhood.

Professor Dan Zahavi

Professor Dan Zahavi

University of Copenhagen, Denmark

10:10-10:20 Discussion
10:20-10:30 Poster spotlights
10:30-11:00 Break
11:00-11:30 Narrative self and identity
Professor Marya Schechtman

Professor Marya Schechtman

University of Illinois Chicago, USA

11:30-11:40 Discussion
11:40-12:10 The distributed adaptive control of self and volition: the case for the plausibility of biological free will in the physical universe and its synthesis in living machines

The Distributed Adaptive Control (DAC) theory of mind and brain posits that the brain can be conceived as a multi-layered control system across which distinct processing cascades transform and integrate states of the World, Self, and Action. From the perspective of multi-layered control, the Self can be understood as comprising four components: reactive, adaptive, contextual, and virtualisation. These four layers of self are constructed from evolutionary ancient allostatic self-preservation mechanisms, which respond to challenges posed by the physically instantiated self and its environment, to the adaptive representation of the niche, the needs of the self, and the action repertoire, to the goal-oriented policy construction by the contextual self, and the meta-representational and auto-noetic declarative understanding of the virtualised self. Moving across these levels of control, the representation and control of perception, self, and action triades become increasingly dependent on memory systems and the intrinsic dynamics of the brain. As an example, we can consider the immediate responses to the triggering stimuli linked to stereotyped behaviours to the exploration of potential future action policies through mental time travel. This indicates that behavioural control balances the trade-off between robust, inflexible, fast responses and brittle, flexible, and slow choices. In this progression from reacting in a predetermined way to flexible and deliberate choice in unknown environments and tasks, the brain is extracting itself from the coercion of real-world forces and displaying a capability of freedom of choice or free will, allowing the Self to autonomously not only control its interactions with the environment but in turn shape this environment as a form of niche construction. This contribution will develop the notion that a multi-level understanding of Self by necessity links it to Free Will. I will contrast this view to the alternative deterministic perspective and argue that compatibility between a biologically grounded notion of embodied free will and a pseudo-deterministic universe can be found when considering the critical dynamics of the brain, its explicit meta-control through various neuronal pathways, combined with the brain’s mechanisms of counter-factual learning and epistemic autonomy.

Professor Paul Verschure

Professor Paul Verschure

Universidad Miguel Hernandez de Elche, Spain

12:10-12:20 Discussion
12:20-12:30 Poster spotlights

Chair

Professor Tony Prescott, University of Sheffield, UK

Professor Tony Prescott

University of Sheffield, UK

13:30-14:00 How does the developing brain construct a self?

Our capacity for self-awareness is often considered a defining feature of human consciousness and in adulthood allows us to imagine how others see us, recollect our past, and contemplate our future. Our work has shown that in infancy, the emergence of self-representation in the second year of life profoundly changes developing cognition. Yet, there are currently no mechanistic accounts of how it could develop, and empirical investigation within contemporary developmental science is surprisingly absent. In this talk, Professor Southgate will propose a new account of the development of self-representation. Drawing on a wealth of data from cognitive neuroscience and developmental psychology, this account articulates a mechanistic pathway through which self-awareness emerges as a consequence of being the recipient of caregiver ostensive cues. First, signals like direct gaze modulate the infant’s heartrate, bringing it to awareness and resulting in a feeling state functionally specified as belonging to the body. Second, infants have an expectation that communicative cues are referential. Professor Southgate proposes that this expectation leads infants to generate a placeholder referent when they are the recipient of others’ ostension, because in the absence of a representation of self, they are initially unable to identify themselves as the referent. However, with time they will fill this placeholder with the feeling state accompanying the modulation of heartrate, and it is in this process that an initial concept of self emerges.  This account accommodates cross-cultural data indicating wide variation in the development of self-awareness in early development, as well as apparent species differences in the capacity for self-representation.

Professor Victoria Southgate

Professor Victoria Southgate

University of Copenhagen, Denmark

14:00-14:10 Discussion
14:10-14:40 The embodied self

Studying the prerequisites for an artificial self can provide insights into the processes of self-construction in humans, as well as into principles of learning and development in robotics, and can enable more intuitive human-robot interaction. In this talk, Professor Hafner will discuss the prerequisites for developing a minimal self in artificial embodied systems, introduce measures of the self, and present computational models that enable decision making and tool-use.

Professor Verena Hafner

Professor Verena Hafner

Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany

14:40-14:50 Discussion
14:50-15:00 Poster spotlights
15:00-15:30 Break
15:30-16:00 The body, felt and perceived, as first prior

How do we come to be the way we are? Tracing the origins of selfhood takes us back to the experience of one’s body as a first prior. Starting from the privileged status that homeostatic priors have within the cortical hierarchy of an organism whose main imperative is to maintain homeostasis, one can consider the mechanisms that underlie interoceptive precision and its impact on embodiment and cognition. But the self’s body is not only felt from within, it is also perceived and understood from the outside. The psychological roles that interoception and exteroception play for the scaffolding, maintenance or updating of self-awareness throughout life need to be understood not in their antagonism but in their integration. 

Professor Manos Tsakiris

Professor Manos Tsakiris

Royal Holloway, University of London, UK

16:00-16:10 Discussion
16:10-16:40 I, Robot

Under the unrealistic and ethically doubtful endeavour of building conscious machines, we decided to build a sympathetic minimal self on a robot following neuroinspired principles. Our starting point was understanding how the brain perceives and controls the body, and our endpoint will be achieving physical intelligence. Grounded on well-known theories, such as the Ideomotor, the Comparatory model, and the Free Energy Principle, I summarise a set of experiments and theoretical accounts that drive us from learning the sensorimotor mapping behind body ownership to controlling and anticipating and the consequences of the robot actions, developing some kind of agentive behaviour. In particular, I describe the generalisation of von Helmholtz's perceptual unconscious inferences to action, showing that we exert compensatory movements to reduce our world model uncertainty, complementing the classical intentional goal-directed movements. Its corollary is my proposal of an Embodied Turing Test where the active self participates as a key ingredient in problem-solving. This experiment forces the "facio, ergo sum, ergo cogito", as the robot needs to disambiguate itself before making any decision. Fortunately, we failed, the robot is still not conscious. But, can robots think about thinking?

Dr Pablo Lanillos

Dr Pablo Lanillos

Spanish National Research Council, Spain

16:40-16:50 Discussion
16:50-17:00 ECR short talk 1

Chair

Professor Agnieszka Wykowska, Italian Institute of Technology, Italy

Professor Agnieszka Wykowska

Italian Institute of Technology, Italy

09:00-09:30 Interoception and emotion in sense of self

Interoception is the process by which the nervous system senses, integrates and interprets internal bodily sensations, such as signals arising from the heart. Affective and emotional feeling states are influenced by different levels of interoceptive processing. These levels encompass afferent, neural, behavioural accuracy and higher-order measures related to interoceptive judgments ascertained via subjective report and the attribution of bodily signals. This talk will detail how these different interoceptive dimensions, at different levels of processing, can guide and shape cognition and emotion processing. The nature of afferent signals, their representation in brain, their precision and higher order representation are selectively altered in different clinical conditions, with implications for symptom expression.

Professor Sarah Garfinkel

Professor Sarah Garfinkel

University College London, UK

09:30-09:40 Discussion
09:40-10:10 Body and self: hostile interactions

This talk presents a snippet from the planned article (with Olaf Blanke) for the PTRS-B on Phantomology. Phantomology, a term borrowed from Stanisław Lem, is the study of the virtual reality of the "body-in-the-brain", that is, the phenomenal awareness of having a bodily existence. Across all levels of phantomisation—phantom limbs, phantom hemibodies, and phantoms of the self (doppelgänger)—clinical cases reveal striking instances of aggression toward the body or some of its parts. Professor Brugger will touch on anarchic limbs, the hatred of hemiplegic twins, and hostile doppelgänger. Additionally, he will discuss Body Integrity Dysphoria (BID), better known as the desire for healthy limb amputation. Professor Brugger will share his ambivalence regarding its classification as a mental disorder in ICD-11. Is it pathological to desire the amputation of a major limb? Where is the boundary between erotic and hostile body modification? Phantomology seeks to provide a unified framework for understanding the relationship between body and self—one that includes psychological dimensions, regardless of whether such experiences are deemed healthy, pathological, or otherwise deviant by a given society.

Professor Peter Brugger

Professor Peter Brugger

University of Zurich, Switzerland

10:10-10:20 Discussion
10:20-10:30 ECR short talk 2
10:30-11:00 Break
11:00-11:30 Diversity of the individual and the social self in autism spectrum disorder (ASD)

Successful communication depends largely on the appropriate temporal organisation of intrapersonal and interpersonal signals in non-verbal communication. The psychopathological condition of ASD can serve as a diversity model for the intrapersonal and interpersonal synchrony of communicative signals. Our own studies on the intrapersonal synchrony of pointing behaviour and gaze behaviour showed a higher latency between the two signals and a higher variability in people with ASD. When comparing social pointing behaviour with simple motor tasks, we only found cross-domain associations between social and non-social traits in control subjects, but not in autistic individuals. This argues against a general synchronisation deficit in ASD and instead underlines the individual developmental heterogeneity in the acquisition of domain-specific behaviours. When transferring this measured nonverbal behaviour to virtual characters, the behaviour of the characters indicating ASD led to overall prolonged decoding times in the observers, and this effect was even more pronounced in observers with ASD. The results emphasise the importance of temporal differences in production and perception processes during multimodal nonverbal communication. These studies are complemented by findings that individuals with ASD are not able to recognise social intentions in gaze behaviour. Finally, dyadic communication shows that reciprocal gaze plays a much smaller role in encounters between individuals with ASD. In summary, results suggest that the coordination of communicative signals both intra- and interpersonally contribute to successful communication. To summarise, the current findings locate the manifestation of reduced reciprocity in autism not only in the person, but also in the interactional dynamics of dyads.

Professor Kai Vogeley

Professor Kai Vogeley

University of Cologne, Germany

11:30-11:40 Discussion
11:40-12:10 Panel: Experience of diversity of self
Professor Sarah Garfinkel

Professor Sarah Garfinkel

University College London, UK

12:10-12:20 ECR short talk 3

Chair

Professor Paul Verschure, Universidad Miguel Hernandez de Elche, Spain

Professor Paul Verschure

Universidad Miguel Hernandez de Elche, Spain

13:20-13:50 The interpersonal self

The self is formed not only in individual context, but also during, and through, interactions with others. In this talk, I will focus on one of the aspects of the minimal self, namely sense of agency, in the context of social interactions. I will present empirical work conducted in my lab, where we studied sense joint agency in joint actions, individual sense of agency in a social context and vicarious sense of agency. Importantly, I will discuss social interactions not only with other humans, but also (and primarily) with humanoid robots. It is the latter case that provides important insights on conditions under which sense of agency is affected by social context. More specifically, our results show that attribution of intentionality to the robot partner is a key factor determining the emergence of sense of joint agency. On the other hand, physical embodiment and sensorimotor repertoire analogous to that of a human are crucial for vicarious sense of agency to occur. I will discuss the insights obtained through our empirical work in broader context of extended self.

Professor Agnieszka Wykowska

Professor Agnieszka Wykowska

Italian Institute of Technology, Italy

13:50-14:00 Discussion
14:00-14:30 The temporally-extended self: into the past and future

How do we know and experience ourselves as existing over time? How is it that, despite the many changes that we encounter over our lifetime, we have some sense of a persisting entity that remains with us as we age? Diachronic unity is fundamental to the temporally-extended self, enabling us to simultaneously hold both changes and continuity of the self over time – and to reconcile and integrate these two aspects of self. In this talk, I will discuss evidence for a candidate cognitive mechanism underpinning diachronic unity: autobiographical memory. Remembering our previous experiences or possessing knowledge of what has happened in our lives provide direct connections to our past selves and a confirmation of our existence over time. Similarly, prospection enables the extension of the self into the future and is also argued to be underpinned by autobiographical memory. I will discuss evidence from neuropsychology that the loss of autobiographical memory can erode the temporal self by degrading these connections to our past and future selves, as well as new neuroscientific research on the temporal self at timescales of seconds to years. Finally, I will consider the idea that non-mnemonic processes may provide an important basis for the temporal continuity of the self.

Professor Donna Rose Addis

Professor Donna Rose Addis

University of Toronto, Canada

14:30-14:40 Discussion
14:40-15:10 Break
15:10-15:40 The evolution of shared agency and social identity

Individuals in the modern world have complex social identities based on the groups and social categories with which they identify. Social psychology has shown that identifying with groups, even artificial minimal groups, generates behavioural effects in adults and children, such as ingroup favouritism, loyalty, and conformity. We propose that such effects originated evolutionarily from humans' unique skills and motivations to form shared agencies, with the evolutionarily original form of social identity being one's moral identity as a cooperative group member. For ancient humans, survival depend on being an assimilated member of a cultural group that was in turn competing against other groups. This context selected for self-reflective capacity to adopt a social identity (ie to view oneself as a member of a particular group) and concomitant self-regulatory motivations to maintain a positive social identity (ie to ensure that "I" the individual am being in line with what "we" the group expect, often via conformity). This evolutionary perspective helps account for a range of findings. Behavioural effects of group identity (eg ingroup favouritism, loyalty, conformity), moral emotions (eg guilt), and moral reasoning (eg deploying reasons and justifications to defend against threats to one's moral identity) are all expressions of social identity as a self-regulatory mechanism for maintaining one's good standing as a committed and trustworthy group member.

Dr Leon Li

Dr Leon Li

Leipzig University, Germany

15:40-15:50 Discussion
15:50-16:20 Neuroscience of self-consciousness: embodied and extended

Humans experience a ‘real me’ that ‘resides’ in ‘my’ body and is experienced as the subject (or ‘I’) of conscious experience and thought. This aspect of self-consciousness, namely the feeling that conscious experiences are bound to the self and are experiences of a unitary entity (‘I’), is often considered to be one of the most astonishing features of the human mind. Professor Blanke will present recent work that targets self-consciousness by investigating a minimal form of self-consciousness that is based on the multisensory perception of tactile, proprioceptive, visual signals as well as interoceptive signals and has been studied in cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and in neurological patients (ie bodily self-consciousness, BSC). Highlighting a series of studies investigating two fundamental aspects of BSC, referred to as self-location and self-identification with an individual’s body, Professor Blanke shows that BSC is based on torso-centered signals in a distributed cortical network, centered in temporo-parietal cortex. Such a torso-centered BSC system, by coupling exteroceptive and interoceptive signals, is fundamental for self-consciousness, leading to conscious mental states that are experienced as if by a unitary and embodied subject. In a second part of his presentation, Professor Blanke will highlight recent work that explores links between BSC (self-location, the first-person perspective, sense of agency) and so-called extended or narrative self-consciousness (NSC), in particular spatial navigation and episodic autobiographical memory. He will present data showing that changes in BSC impact (1) spatial navigation performance and grid-cell like activity in entorhinal cortex and are of relevance (2) in episodic autobiographical memory, mediated by hippocampal activity coupled with BSC regions. These data link key subjective components of BSC with spatial navigation and the subjective reliving of personal events from one’s past.

Professor Olaf Blanke

Professor Olaf Blanke

Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Switzerland

16:20-16:30 Discussion
16:30-17:00 Panel: future directions
Professor Tony Prescott

Professor Tony Prescott

University of Sheffield, UK